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This paper examines the seaborne/airborne concept, an 
approach to expeditionary warfare developed in Britain in 
the early 1960s. It identifies the strategic challenges that 
forced Britain to reassess its approach to the projection of 
power overseas and identifies the ways in which the new 
concept sought to meet these challenges. The ‘lessons’ 
learned from experience at Suez (1956) and Kuwait (1961) 
and their impact on procurement and on inter-service 
relations is addressed. The paper also examines modern 
British doctrine for maritime expeditionary warfare and 
argues that contemporary concepts such as ‘Littoral 
Manoeuvre’ reflect the basic principles established in the 
1960s. 
 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the British Royal Navy has undergone a major shift in 
priority away from planning for sustained ‘blue-water’ sea control operations against 
the Soviet Navy to a focus on power projection within a littoral environment.1 This 
has supported the broader shift within British defence policy away from the defence 
of Europe in Europe towards a focus on dealing with crises at the point of origin.2 
This new focus has brought renewed interest in expeditionary operations. These 
changes have been reflected in the doctrine and procurement of all three services and 
in a growing emphasis on joint (i.e. inter-service) capabilities.  The Royal Navy has 
been particularly keen to embrace this change in priorities, claiming that the enduring 
attributes of maritime forces make them particularly suitable for use in expeditionary 
operations. This is reflected in the latest edition of British Maritime Doctrine and in 
recent and planned enhancements to the navy’s power projection capabilities.3 
Prominent amongst the latter are the construction of new amphibious vessels to 
replace the previous generation of ships built in the 1960s and plans to build two new 
large aircraft carriers. With a likely displacement of around 60,000 tons these ships 
could be almost three times the size of navy’s current Invincible-class aircraft carriers. 
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The provision of new equipment has been matched by the development of new ideas 
about the way in which Britain’s armed forces will conduct expeditionary operations, 
notable amongst these is the navy’s new concept of Littoral Manoeuvre. 
 
It is not the first time that the British armed forces have had to re-adjust their focus 
away from warfighting in Europe towards expeditionary operations further afield. 
Equally, it is not the first time that they have sought to develop new approaches to the 
conduct of such operations in order to exploit the potential of joint forces to achieve 
decisive effect overseas. In the early 1960s the British developed a ‘seaborne/airborne 
concept’ in order to provide new and better means of conducting limited 
expeditionary operations in response to diverse threats and challenges beyond Europe. 
In many senses the basic logic that underlay this concept was the same as that 
articulated by the doctrine writers of today. Despite this, the seaborne/airborne 
concept has been largely forgotten. Numerous authors have examined the general 
policy that this concept was designed to support.4 The concept itself has escaped 
serious attention. This paper will examine the seaborne/airborne concept within the 
context of British defence requirements in the 1960s. It will consider the degree to 
which the concept enabled the armed forces to meet these requirements. The paper 
will also assess the degree to which modern British doctrine, and in particular the 
concept of Littoral Manoeuvre, represents a radical departure or an evolutionary 
development from this older concept. 
 
The Future Navy Process 
The future of the Royal Navy is currently being examined under what the Navy Board 
describes as a Future Navy Process. This consists of three elements: the Future Navy 
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sets out the military strategic concept for the navy in the period 2020 and beyond; the 
Future Maritime Operational Concept identifies how UK maritime forces will fight; 
while the Naval Strategic Plan outlines plans for the next 15 years, providing a 
‘routemap’ for the delivery of the first two elements.5 The Future Navy articulates a 
need to deliver a ‘balanced and rapidly deployable Joint expeditionary warfighting 
capability, to counter conventional and asymmetric threats in areas of strategic 
interest to the UK’. It emphasises a need to achieve global reach and presence and to 
be fully interoperable with other services. There is recognition that future operations 
are likely to be joint and multi-national and to cater for small to medium-scale 
contingencies.6 The over-riding requirement is for versatility in order to be able to 
cater for an unpredictable strategic environment. At the heart of this concept is the 
idea that the navy can provide a Versatile Maritime Force where a variety of 
platforms and systems will exploit the potential offered by a networked enabled 
capability to achieve an effects based approach. Designed to operate in conjunction 
with joint forces, at extended range and in response to a diverse range of challenges 
the Versatile Maritime Force must be ‘operationally agile, demonstrating 
responsiveness, robustness, flexibility, and adaptability’. 7
 
Under the Future Maritime Operational Concept the navy will have four key roles: 
Maritime Force Projection; Theatre Entry; Flexible Global Reach; UK Maritime 
Security; and, Networked C4ISR.8 The first three roles revolve around the use of joint 
expeditionary forces to achieve decisive effect on, and from, the sea. Maritime Force 
Projection is further divided into two sub-categories, Maritime Strike and Littoral 
Manoeuvre. As the name suggests, Maritime Strike revolves around the use of sea 
based capabilities to strike targets at sea and ashore. Littoral Manoeuvre involves the 
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use of the littoral as an operational manoeuvre space from which a sea-based joint 
amphibious force can threaten, or apply and sustain, force ashore.9 It reflects an 
apparently new approach to amphibious operations whereby new technology is linked 
to modern concepts of manoeuvre warfare to enhance the potential of sea based forces 
to achieve decisive effects ashore. In many respects Littoral Manoeuvre represents a 
British adaptation of existing US Marine Corps concepts such as Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea and, more recently, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.10 This 
is particularly notable at the tactical level in the emphasis placed on sea basing, 
operations ‘over-the-horizon’ and in ship-to-objective manoeuvre.  
 
Littoral Manoeuvre aims to cater for a forward deployed, combat ready and self-
sustaining force with an assault echelon of a tailored brigade or less. This force should 
be capable of securing theatre entry in a non-benign environment and without reliance 
on conventional reception facilities. It is claimed that an integrated force package of 
Maritime Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre capabilities could ‘poise for extended 
periods, demonstrating political intent, prepared for rapid coercive intervention 
across the spectrum of military tasks, yet without prescribing subsequent committal of 
force’. A particular advantage of such a force would be that, being sea based, it would 
‘have the considerable advantage in conflict of a reduced land footprint and a lesser 
reliance on [host nation support] and over-flight rights.’11  Notwithstanding the 
above, there is recognition that the concept will draw upon joint assets and its 
application is not confined to the navy or marines. There is also recognition that 
developments in maritime doctrine must be co-ordinated with the air and land 
equivalents. 
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Littoral Manoeuvre and the wider operational concept that it contributes to were 
prompted by a combination of opportunity and need. The former relates to the ability 
to reallocate resources away from old Cold War priorities and to harness new 
developments that have enhanced the manoeuvre and strike potential of conventional 
forces. The latter relates to the need to develop military options to meet a diverse 
range of limited military challenges that are likely to occur beyond Europe. These 
could range from disaster relief to non-combatant evacuations, peace support 
operations through to medium or large scale operations such as the recent 
interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). There is an acceptance that the 
latter will only be conducted in conjunction with the US.12 These developments are 
not unprecedented. The British went through a similar process in the late 1950s when 
a perceived reduction in the likelihood of conventional war in Europe provided an 
opportunity to re-allocate resources to expeditionary capabilities at a time when the 
government was becoming increasingly concerned by instability in Africa and Asia, 
particularly in the region ‘east of Suez’.13 At the same time, the failure of British arms 
during the 1956 Suez Crisis, allied to the impending loss of many overseas bases, 
brought a pressing need to develop new means of projecting British military power. 
 
No End of a Lesson14
 
On 26 July 1956 President Nasser of Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal. Over three 
months later British and French forces, in transparent collusion with Israel, launched a 
major joint operation to secure control of the canal and, it was hoped, prompt the 
downfall of Nasser. The result was a fiasco. A combination of diplomatic and 
financial pressure forced Britain to halt operations within hours of the seaborne 
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landing on 6 November. The operation, code-named Musketeer, failed to achieve any 
of its objectives. The British were humiliated. Faced with an unexpected crisis 
requiring an expeditionary operation the British armed forces had been found 
wanting. There were insufficient forces available in July to provide a rapid and 
effective response to the act of nationalisation. The time needed to cobble together 
such a capability provided ample opportunity for domestic and international 
opposition to military action to mount.  It was the end of September before the armed 
forces were ready to act; by which time it was probably already too late. The actual 
tactical conduct of Musketeer could have been considered competent if it had 
occurred in a political vacuum. It was not as it did not. The pedestrian pace of 
operations, including five days of air operations before the first troops parachuted into 
Port Said on 5 November, maximised the potential for the government to be subjected 
to intolerable pressure.15  
 
The Suez crisis cruelly exposed how ill equipped Britain was to conduct 
expeditionary operations at short notice. Neither the airborne brigade (16th 
Independent Brigade Group) nor its amphibious equivalent (No. 3 Commando 
Brigade, Royal Marines) was available to operate in their primary role at short notice. 
The aircraft and amphibious ships required to land these forces were old, obsolescent 
and not available in sufficient numbers or, in the case of landing ships and craft, at 
short notice. Musketeer demonstrated that British attitudes towards airborne and 
amphibious operations had not kept pace with the times. In the case of the former, 
French airborne forces were better equipped, better trained and more experienced. 
French commanders identified British caution, including a reluctance to use their 
airborne forces in a daring fashion, as one of the reasons for the failure of the 
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operation.16 Since 1945 British policy towards amphibious operations had focused on 
raiding and on the need to prepare for large scale operations in the later stages of a 
major war. Limited intervention in circumstances short of all-out war had not been 
emphasised.17 It is therefore not surprising that the amphibious landing at Port Said 
was more reminiscent of the slow, methodical approach required during the Second 
World War than the type of rapid and flexible operation that might have brought 
success within an acceptable timeframe.. As Major General James Moulton RM later 
noted, it was ‘…a lash-up of half-forgotten ideas of the Second World War, more apt 
to an old comrades parade than to modern war’.18 One enterprising aspect of the 
operation, the first ever use of helicopters in an amphibious assault, was more 
groundbreaking in a theoretical than a practical sense. The helicopters, operating from 
two light aircraft carriers, landed their marines on the beach, in the same place that 
old fashioned landing craft would have put them, albeit more quickly and without the 
need to get their boots wet. Suggestions that they could be used in a more innovative 
fashion were rejected.19
 
Even more worrying than the tactical deficiencies evident during Musketeer were the 
shortcomings within Britain’s overall strategy for responding to crises overseas. 
British defence policy beyond Europe remained wedded to the use of a string of 
overseas bases. Many of these proved useless in 1956, either because they were in the 
wrong place or because, in the heat of a crisis, political interference limited their use. 
The governments of Jordan, Libya and Ceylon all refused to allow the British to use 
established facilities within their territory to support operations against Egypt. There 
were also serious doubts about the long-term future of many existing bases. It is 
noteworthy that Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal a matter of days after the last 
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British troops withdrew from the old base in the Suez Canal Zone. This base, once 
considered vital to Britain’s strategic interests, had had to be abandoned in the face of 
intense Egyptian opposition to the presence of British troops and facilities on their 
soil.20 Only the most myopic observer could fail to appreciate that similar problems 
could be experienced with the remaining British bases on non-sovereign territory. The 
loss of facilities in Iraq after the revolution in that state in 1958 only served to 
reinforce this point.  
 
British Strategy in the Sixties 
 
Even prior to the Suez crisis British defence planners had begun to believe that a 
change in overall priority was required. From the time of the 1952 Global Strategy 
Paper Britain had placed an emphasis on deterring war in Europe using nuclear 
weapons rather than defending it with conventional forces. The Chiefs of Staff 
increasingly believed that a major war against the Soviet Union was unlikely but 
should it occur, it would involve the use of nuclear weapons at an early stage. As such 
it was important to prevent the outbreak of a major war through deterrence, but the 
means of actually fighting such a war could receive a low priority. At the same time 
they recognised that there was an increased danger of instability and small-scale 
hostilities as Cold War tensions combined with the impact of de-colonisation to 
ferment trouble overseas.21 In contrast to the views expressed in the Global Strategy 
Paper, by 1956 there was also an appreciation that nuclear weapons could play, at 
best, only a peripheral role in deterring limited conflict beyond Europe. In such 
conditions, and with the loss of the base at Suez, planning focused on the 
establishment of a central strategic reserve that could respond to crises overseas. The 
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events of 1956 reinforced the logic of this. The 1957 Defence Review announced that 
the central strategic reserve would be better funded and receive greater emphasis than 
static garrisons. Strategic mobility would be exploited to provide flexible military 
options with smaller and, for the first time since 1939, fully professional armed 
forces.22
 
The Admiralty were already aware of such developments and the First Sea Lord, 
Admiral Mountbatten, had taken steps to evaluate the role of the navy in such 
circumstances.23 In June 1956, prior to the Suez crisis, the Board of Admiralty 
approved proposals to reduce the emphasis placed on major war contingencies and to 
improve capabilities to meet limited challenges overseas. This resulted, in July 1956, 
in a concept for the Future Role of the Navy, whereby the navy would support British 
interests overseas through the deployment of a task force built around an aircraft 
carrier, a helicopter equipped commando carrier, a cruiser and four destroyers.24 The 
debacle at Suez reinforced these developments and this was reflected in the 1957 
Defence Review.25 The navy’s new priorities were codified in the famous ‘Autumn 
Naval Rethink’ of 1957.26
 
In June 1959 the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, established a ‘Future Policy’ 
committee under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary, Norman Brook.27 The 
military used the guidelines established by the committee to inform their own major 
study into the requirements for ‘British Strategy in the Sixties’.28 The following 
criteria were adopted for strategy short of major war: 
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1. land forces would nowhere be engaged on a scale greater than a reinforced 
brigade group 
2. no major operation would be undertaken in more than one theatre at a 
time, and not more often than once in a period of two years in any one 
theatre 
3. any period of intense fighting was unlikely to be prolonged, a matter of 
weeks rather than months. 
 
It was recognised that in circumstances where British forces intervened there would 
be occasions when points of entry would be in hostile hands, ‘requiring us to face 
opposition to establish ourselves’. The Chiefs of Staff did not believe, however, that 
they would be required to attempt full-scale assaults against heavy opposition without 
the assistance of allies.29  
 
Operation Musketeer had demonstrated the danger of using old and outdated 
equipment and techniques in expeditionary operations. A number of study groups 
were set up to examine the requirement for new amphibious shipping. Plans for the 
replacement of the existing vessels were influenced by the experience of Musketeer 
and by a close liaison with the US Marine Corps. In both cases this pointed towards 
the use of helicopters from aircraft carrier-type vessels. As a result, in 1957 the Navy 
announced the conversion of HMS Bulwark, a light fleet carrier, into a helicopter 
equipped ‘commando carrier’. This was followed in 1962 by the similar conversion of 
Bulwark’s sister ship, HMS Albion. The commando ships, as they were known from 
1962, were designed to embark a Royal Marine Commando unit and 16 medium lift 
helicopters. The embarked force was later expanded to include additional support 
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elements and a battery of 105-mm guns. The ships were to be able to provide 
complete administrative support for their embarked force in combat for 14 days at 
intensive rates, and for 42 days at reduced rates.30  
 
By the nature of their design, and the lift limitations of their helicopters31, the 
commando ships provided a relatively lightly armed military force somewhat akin to a 
parachute battalion, albeit with more reliable logistic support and better tactical 
mobility. A more balanced lift capacity was to be provided by two new assault ships 
(LPDs) and six Landing Ship, Logistic (LSL). Once they entered service these vessels 
would provide improved, speed, endurance and habitability compared to the old ships 
that they replaced. They were designed specifically to support an expeditionary 
strategy in which the requirement for speed and flexibility was paramount but where 
there was still a need to land balanced forces, including heavy armoured fighting 
vehicles, without the use of conventional port facilities.32 The LPDs, HMS Fearless 
and Intrepid, entered service in 1965 and 1967 respectively followed by the six LSLs 
between 1964 and 1967. 
  
Air transport capabilities were also enhanced. Some improvements pre-dated 
Musketeer, including the introduction of new Blackburn Beverley and de Havilland 
Comet aircraft. In the years that followed 1956 the older aircraft of RAF Transport 
Command were replaced with the introduction of increased numbers of more modern 
types including the Bristol Britannia (1959), the Hawker Siddely Argosy (1961), the 
Short Belfast (1966), the BAC VC10 (1966) and the Hawker Siddely Andover (1966). 
In 1967 the RAF took possession of their first US-built Lockhead C-130 Hercules.33 
By 1962 Transport Command possessed 141 fixed-wing transport aircraft and 54 
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helicopters.34 Three years later its commander-in-chief, Air Marshal Sir Kenneth 
Cross,  reported that his headquarters controlled 18 stations, 12,227 RAF personnel, 
2,600 civilians and around 200 aircraft.35 The expansion in capabilities was matched 
by an increase in joint exercises. Whereas there had only been three airborne and air-
transport exercises in 1956, there were 45 in 1959.36 Transport Command was 
responsible for providing parachute training from the army. In 1960 there were 36,000 
parachute jumps from their aircraft and the army’s training programme for 1960-1 
included over one hundred air-mobility exercises.37 In order to facilitate closer co-
operation with the army it was decided to concentrate the Command’s tactical 
elements into a single group. As a result No.38 Group was created in 1960. In 1962 
this Group was reinforced by the addition of two squadrons of Hunter fighter/ground 
attack aircraft. It could now provide close air support in addition to tactical transport. 
According to Air Marshal Cross the result was a ‘powerful UK based tactical group… 
“exportable” to any part of the world’. He anticipated No. 38 Group operating as part 
of a Joint Tactical Task Force in conjunction with the navy’s aircraft carriers and 
troops from the army’s strategic reserve.38
 
There was little point in buying new equipment and generating new capabilities 
without also updating the way in which the armed forces operated.  Thus, while the 
Admiralty studied the requirement for new amphibious ships and craft, Amphibious 
Warfare Headquarters (AWHQ) and the Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Centre 
(JSAWC) at Poole undertook a review of amphibious techniques.39 Within both 
organisations there was an appreciation that the review could not be conducted in a 
vacuum. It also needed to take into account the planned expansion of air-transport 
capabilities. Responsibility in this field lay with the Land/Air Warfare Committee40 
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and the School of Land/Air Warfare at Old Sarum. The acceptance that the air and 
maritime aspects of expeditionary operations needed to be considered together led to 
increasing liaison between the establishments at Poole and Old Sarum. The result was 
the development of a new concept of operations described as the 
seaborne/airborne/land concept or, more frequently, simply the seaborne/airborne 
concept. In 1960 AWHQ and the JSAWC presented and discussed the new concept at 
the staff colleges, on Senior Officer’s courses and at appropriate operational 
commands. It was recognised that the concept would be most effective after 1965 by 
which time it was expected that new equipment would support its application. 
Nevertheless, the Chief of Amphibious Warfare believed that it was equally 
applicable with the existing force structure.41
 
The concept was explicitly joint, it being recognised that the only way to maintain an 
adequate balance and level of force was for air-transported and amphibious forces to 
operate together as part of a single-team. As such there was recognition that a fully 
integrated inter-service approach was required to promulgate and direct new policy.42 
As a result AWHQ and the Land/Air Warfare Committee were disbanded, being 
replaced by a new Joint Warfare Committee (JWC). The JWC was composed of 
senior representatives from each service and was charged with the direction and co-
ordination of joint tactical doctrines, techniques, procedures and training requirements 
and for all aspects of seaborne/airborne operations short of global war, excluding 
essentially single service matters. The JWC was supported by a Joint Warfare Staff 
and by a number of sub-committees. The first director of the Joint Warfare Staff was 
Major-General Houghton RM. Houghton had been Chief of Amphibious Warfare 
until that post was abolished with the creation of the JWC. A Joint Warfare 
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Establishment was formed to replace the separate Joint Services Amphibious Warfare 
Centre and the School of Land/Air Warfare. Institutional structures were thus adapted 
to meet the requirement for ‘jointery’.43
 
The Seaborne/Airborne Concept 
 
The new seaborne/airborne concept of operations was designed to enable a rapid and 
flexible response to unforeseen crises overseas. It emphasised a requirement for 
greater mobility by sea and air in order to meet the challenge of conducting 
expeditionary warfare in a highly politicised environment and with a reduced reliance 
on fixed bases. In such circumstances a small but adaptable military force that could 
be made available at the appropriate time and place was more relevant than larger, 
more capable forces that were difficult to deploy within an acceptable time-scale. The 
lessons of Musketeer had been learnt. For military force to be useful it had to be 
useable. However, speed and deployability on their own were not enough. The 
concept had to provide for the kind of forces that would be strong enough to prevail in 
the types of operation that were envisaged. These could involve operations against 
‘moderate’ opposition equipped with Soviet weaponry including tanks. 
 
According to the Joint Planning Staff, the seaborne/airborne concept was designed to 
meet the following requirement: 
 
…the rapid concentration of land forces, with naval and air offensive and 
transport support, and their introduction into areas remote from main 
bases. The operations could vary from an unopposed entry to a combined 
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air and seaborne assault, though assault against a heavily defended 
coastline is not contemplated.44
 
As long warning periods could not be relied upon there was an expectation that the 
initial response to any crisis would be met by forces maintained within theatre and 
that some land forces were likely to be stationed afloat. The majority of follow-on 
forces would arrive by air from the UK, although heavy equipment would have to 
come by sea. Troops arriving by air would rely on stockpiled equipment maintained in 
likely areas of operations.45 There would therefore continue to be a requirement for 
some form of base within the theatre, if not actually within the immediate locality of 
the crisis. The maintenance of a permanent floating stockpile independent of local 
shore facilities does not appear to have been entertained seriously.  
 
The British did have some experience of maintaining floating stockpiles. From 1960 
half a squadron of Centurion tanks was kept afloat in the Persian Gulf in a Landing 
Ship Tank (LST) in order to be available for operations in Kuwait at short notice. The 
remainder of the squadron was maintained in Aden and, with a second LST, was able 
to rotate with the forces in the Gulf in order to maintain a permanent deployment. The 
crews were deployed with their tanks, except in the summer when it was sometimes 
necessary to leave the tanks crews ashore as some of the LSTs were not air 
conditioned. It was not felt conducive to the fitness or morale of the soldiers to leave 
them sweltering in the confined space of such ships. The sailors, of course, did not get 
a choice in the matter. In such circumstances the tanks crews stayed in Aden and 
could be flown forward to join the LST and their vehicles at Bahrain should the need 
arise.46 This tiresome deployment was necessary because the Kuwaiti government 
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would not allow the tanks to be stockpiled on Kuwaiti soil, presumably due to the 
political fallout that would be associated with too overt a reliance on British military 
assistance. Unfortunately, the slow speed of the old LSTs meant that tanks held 
ashore at Aden could not be made available in Kuwait at short notice, hence the 
creation of the ‘Seaborne Tank Force’. This force alleviated the problems associated 
with the lack of a forward base in Kuwait but it could not completely remove the 
requirement for facilities within theatre.47
 
The need to be able to respond rapidly did not just apply to Kuwait. There was a 
realisation that future operations were likely to require a speedy reaction in situations 
where the enemy held the initiative. In 1962 the Joint Warfare Staff prepared detailed 
notes on the seaborne/airborne concept, explaining that: 
 
In the present concept of limited war our forces must be ready to counter 
sudden enemy intervention in a country that is neutral or friendly to us. The 
enemy will have the initiative and will be able to strike at the time and place 
he chooses. Even if his moves can be foreseen, our forces may not be able to 
land before his active intervention, for political reasons. The requirement is 
for a force that can act quickly and is ready to fight immediately in an area 
that may be far from its base; and that has the fighting power and mobility to 
take offensive action and get quick results to prevent the war from extending 
or from escalating to global war.48
 
Under the seaborne/airborne concept the sea and air transported elements of an 
expeditionary force would each provide capabilities best suited to their own 
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characteristics and to the kind of operations expected. In essence, air transport offered 
a means of transporting troops and light equipment very quickly over long distance. 
Sea transport provided heavy lift capability and was free from the problems of staging 
and over-flight rights that were associated with long-range military air transport. It 
was hoped that in ideal circumstances air and sea elements would arrive 
simultaneously and in close proximity. As this could not be guaranteed each element 
would need to be able to operate independently in the initial stages of an operation, 
and thus each element needed to be as balanced as possible. This was easier for the 
sea based element as air transported forces lacked the ability to land heavy equipment 
and armour.  
 
Under this concept forces were required to be able to land over open beaches, through 
small ports or at improvised airstrips. Conventional harbour and airport facilities 
could not be counted on, as they were extremely vulnerable to enemy action. Even in 
intervention in support of an ally such facilities could be closed due to strikes, 
sabotage, panic or for unforeseen political reasons. Speed and flexibility of response 
were seen as attributes that could be exploited to defeat an opponent before they had 
sufficient time to consolidate their defences, reducing the requirement to conduct 
major assault landings: 
  
A deliberate assault will take time to prepare, and this delay may favour the 
enemy more than ourselves, for political as well as military reasons. It may 
often be best to land immediately before the enemy can consolidate his 
position and while he is off balance after a quick advance. Both air 
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transported and amphibious forces must be able to fight their way in against 
such light defences as the enemy will have had time to prepare. 
 
Given the uncertain and rapidly evolving nature of likely operations there was 
recognition that it would not always be possible to know until a few hours before the 
event whether or not a landing would be opposed. In such circumstances it was 
important to be able to land in a fighting posture.49 This was not a concept for 
strategic transport; it was a concept for expeditionary warfare.  
 
The seaborne/airborne concept articulated a new approach to the conduct of 
expeditionary operations that supported a change in British strategy. Notwithstanding 
the planned enhancement of resources in this field, the seaborne/airborne concept 
essentially represented a better way of using existing capabilities. The concept 
provided for a change in priority and an emphasis on joint operations, but in most 
senses at the tactical level it represented an evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
development.  The concept articulated an approach to amphibious warfare that 
avoided the focus on raiding and on large-scale assaults in Europe that had dominated 
British thinking since 1945.50 Nevertheless, tactical methods still remained focused 
on securing a beachhead before breaking out to secure the operation’s objectives. The 
assault would still be conducted by infantry, armour and supporting arms landed in 
conventional landing craft from ships anchored offshore. The use of helicopters did 
add a new aspect to such operations, but the primary role of such aircraft would be to 
support the seaborne landing by securing flanks, high ground or exit points or by 
helping to suppress defences such as enemy gun emplacements. Helicopter forces 
could also offer a means of reinforcing a beachhead rapidly in response to 
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developments ashore. Airborne forces could fulfil similar functions, although they 
were unable to fulfil the role of floating reserve. The main role of the helicopter was 
thus focused on the beachhead in support of more conventional amphibious forces.  
There was an appreciation that, in the right circumstances, helicopter landed troops 
could provide a rapid and flexible intervention capability on their own. Moreover, the 
Joint Warfare Staff did recognise that helicopters might be used to land troops inland 
directly at the objective itself. However, they noted the vulnerability of the aircraft 
and also of troops deployed in such a manner if heavier sea-landed forces were not 
able to provide rapid support.51 Such an approach might be suitable where the scale of 
opposition was light, such as at Tanganyika in 196452, or where amphibious forces 
were being deployed in support of any ally53, it would be dangerous against a well-
equipped opponent.  
 
The Joint Warfare Staff summarised the concept in the following terms: 
 
The seaborne/airborne concept envisages amphibious and air transported 
troops landing at short notice and operating as a single team, each providing 
the forces best suited to its means. They will land simultaneously, if 
possible, but each force must be balanced to enable it to operate 
independently for a while; and both forces must be ready to fight their way 
in.54
 
There was also a requirement for the force to have sound logistical support, 
something that was liable to be challenging in the absence of host nation support or 
local base facilities. In November 1961 Major-General Moulton RM presented a 
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paper on the seaborne/airborne concept at the Royal United Services Institute. He 
made a strong case against the continued reliance on overseas bases arguing that, 
using the new concept, Britain could maintain a military presence overseas east of 
Suez with only one main base in theatre. Brigadier Crookenden, commander of the 
16th Parachute Brigade Group, questioned this suggestion. He doubted whether it 
would be possible to support active operations without a forward bases and that if 
such a base was not available it might have to be captured before operations could 
commence. Such an approach would clearly invalidate the tempo that the concept 
sought to achieve.  
 
Crookenden’s opinion may have been influenced by the fact that the airborne forces 
he commanded could only conduct parachute landings from short or medium range 
transport aircraft. They were thus not altogether suitable for use in a strategy where, 
in future, Britain might have only one permanent base east of Suez. The most likely 
candidate for this facility was Australia, thousands of miles from many potential 
trouble spots. Perhaps naturally, he also believed in the superior tactical value of 
parachute forces compared to the helicopter borne alternative that could be deployed 
from the sea. He claimed that only airborne forces had a true assault capability by day 
or night and that helicopters would be too expensive to risk in an actual assault 
landing. His conclusions in this respect flew in the face of recent British and 
American experience. In response a US Marine Corps officer noted that parachute 
troops possessed very poor battlefield mobility compared with an amphibious force 
and that US experience suggested that helicopters could be used very effectively 
against modern forces, to a depth inland of 100 miles in the initial assault. 55  
Crookenden was not alone in his scepticism about the helicopter. Moulton later 
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recalled that the Commandant of the Army Staff College had criticised the new 
concept of operations when it was presented at Camberley, defending the airborne 
role and claiming that helicopters were very vulnerable. The Commandant, General 
Sir Nigel Poett, had commanded the 5th Parachute Brigade in north-west Europe in 
1944-45.56  The RAF was also concerned about the navy’s new interest in helicopters 
and commando carriers. Their concern appears to have been less focused on the 
tactical value or otherwise of the combination, but rather on a fear that this 
represented the ‘first step’ by the navy into a transport role that they believed was 
their own.57 The seaborne/airborne concept was joint in ethos; the reactions to it 
sometimes were not. 
 
The principles outlined in the seaborne/airborne concept were eventually incorporated 
into a new, multiple volume Manual of Joint Warfare. The various volumes were 
produced by the Joint Warfare Staff in conjunction with the Service Ministries and the 
Joint Warfare Establishment before gaining approval from the Joint Warfare 
Committee. The first edition of the Manual was issued in February 1964. The Manual 
of Joint Warfare incorporated all aspects of land/air warfare, amphibious operations 
and all other aspects of joint operations in non-nuclear warfare beyond Europe. As 
such its focus went beyond that of the seaborne/airborne concept. Nevertheless, the 
concept informed those writing the Manual. The Manual was updated a number of 
times during the 1960s. A revised first edition was issued in November 1965, a 
second edition was issued in April 1967 and this was replaced by a third edition in 
March 1970. By 1970 the Manual of Joint Warfare was no longer focused on non-
nuclear operations beyond Europe, it now included all aspects of joint warfare. In this 
respect it reflected the shift within British defence policy towards a re-focus on war in 
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Europe and on the requirement, inherent within Nato’s new concept of Flexible 
Response, to consider a mix of conventional and nuclear options.58  
 
A Concept Vindicated? 
 
It was not long before the ideas that lay behind the seaborne/airborne concept 
received their first real test. In late June 1961 the British government feared that Iraq 
might invade its newly independent neighbour, Kuwait. Evidence in support of this 
thesis was, at best, scant. Nevertheless, the British were able to persuade the Amir of 
Kuwait that he was in imminent danger and on 30 June he issued a formal request for 
British military support.59 It was therefore decided to initiate the existing plan for 
support to Kuwait, Reinforced Theatre Plan Vantage. The previous day the Cabinet 
Defence Committee had authorised a number of precautionary military moves in 
order to improve readiness. As a result the marines of No. 42 Commando were landed 
in Kuwait by helicopters from HMS Bulwark at around 0900 on 1 July. The marines 
were joined later that day by half a squadron of tanks from the LST HMS Striker, by a 
platoon of marines from a frigate offshore and by two companies of infantry flown 
forward from Bahrain. They were supported by two squadrons of Hunter 
fighter/ground attack aircraft that had deployed to Bahrain the previous day.60 Kuwait 
was only just within the radius of action of the Hunters at Bahrain so during the 
course of 1 July 10 aircraft were flown forward and operated from the new civilian 
airport in Kuwait. Air, maritime and land forces were rushed to the Gulf. The build-up 
of land forces was completed on 9 July, by which time there were 5,668 British 
military personnel in Kuwait. These were supported by two squadrons of Hunters and 
half a squadron of Shackletons at Bahrain, a squadron of Canberra bombers at 
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Sharjah, a number of Canberra photo-reconnaissance aircraft and numerous transport 
aircraft. The Royal Navy had a fleet offshore that contained an aircraft carrier, a 
commando carrier, five escort vessels and almost the entire Amphibious Warfare 
Squadron.61
 
In the face of this display of military muscle the Iraqis did not attack. That they may 
never have had any intention of attacking is somewhat beside the point. Whatever the 
truth of the situation, Iraq was seen to be deterred. Five years after the debacle at Suez 
the British armed forces had provided the government with a notable diplomatic 
success, apparently demonstrating that Britain was a reliable ally in possession of 
modern military capabilities. The Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, saw the 
operation as a vindication of his support for amphibious capabilities and expressed 
this opinion to his Cabinet Colleagues as early as 3 July.62 In their report on Vantage 
the Joint Planning Staff stated that it had been ‘highly successful as a military exercise 
in that it tested, under operational conditions, our capacity to concentrate an effective 
military force over considerable distances in a very short time.’ They believed that 
the operation supported the seaborne/airborne concept and the Chiefs of Staff 
approved this conclusion.63
 
In many senses the operation demonstrated the validity of many of the assumptions 
that lay behind the seaborne/airborne concept. It also demonstrated the limitations of 
existing capabilities. Vantage depended for success on the rapid deployment of 
sufficient British forces to either deter an Iraqi attack, or to hold off an attack long 
enough for reinforcements to arrive. Kuwait lacked the armed forces, topography or 
strategic depth to resist an Iraqi invasion for very long. Unfortunately, for political 
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reasons, the British were unable to base or stockpile significant forces or equipment in 
Kuwait.64 To make matters worse, it was accepted within Whitehall that, should Iraq 
succeed in gaining control of Kuwait, it would not be possible to eject them by force. 
It was not that such an operation would be impossible militarily, but rather than it 
would take so long to mount an assault operation on the scale required that political 
circumstances would make it unrealistic.65 The British were therefore reliant on 
sufficient early warning to allow them to deploy to Kuwait in advance of any attack. 
The events of June 1961 demonstrated that such early warning could be hard to secure 
with any degree of certainty. As a result Vantage was enacted without any clear or 
unambiguous signal that an Iraqi invasion was impending.66 The British could not 
afford to wait. Speed was vital; it would not be sufficient. The force deployed to 
Kuwait had to be credible enough to deter invasion, hence the balance of air and sea 
transported forces. It was hoped that the air element would arrive first, supported by 
the Seaborne Tank Force and with heavy equipment and logistic support coming by 
sea from stockpiles at Bahrain and Aden.  
 
In reality the British response was quick, it could hardly be described as balanced. 
Indeed, in the first days of the operation, surely the most likely time for any Iraqi 
attack to materialise, it is difficult to see how the British/Kuwaiti forces could have 
stemmed any serious enemy advance. The key problem facing the British was the 
failure of the air transport plan. At the outset of the crisis both Sudan and Turkey 
refused to allow British aircraft to use their airspace in order to fly to Kuwait. In 
conjunction with the existing ban on such flights by Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia this meant that there was no easy way of deploying into theatre British forces 
from Cyprus, the UK or Europe. Both Turkey and Sudan relaxed the bans on 1 July, 
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although Turkey re-instituted theirs on 4 July. The manner in which other states could 
hinder or even halt the movement of troops by air was evident. In desperation the 
British were forced to ignore the ban, and with it international law, to allow RAF 
Canberra bombers to re-deploy from Germany via Sudan. There were also covert 
over-flights of Saudi territory.67  
 
Once the political obstacles facing the airlift were overcome, and in the absence of 
any Iraqi action against the airfields in Kuwait, the airlift was very effective. A total 
of 71 RAF transport aircraft were employed, in addition to 17 chartered airliners and 
three aircraft from the Royal Rhodesian Air Force. The majority of troops deployed to 
Kuwait arrived by air.68 There were questions about the impact of extreme heat on 
troops transported directly from the UK to the Middle East, although these were rather 
downplayed by the official report on Vantage.69 Unfortunately, troops airlifted into 
Kuwait often arrived without key pieces of equipment and all were critically short of 
transport. An Army Operational Research Group, sent to Kuwait to investigate 
matters, decided that British forces were so short of transport that they were incapable 
of anything but a static defensive battle. Indeed, the one unit that had arrived ready to 
fight was No.42 Commando, landed by HMS Bulwark.70 The rather chaotic nature of 
the air lift was, in part, a result of a decision to prioritise the movement of fighting 
troops at the expense of the administrative staff who would have managed the 
unloading and distribution of in-coming cargo. This decision was taken due to the 
urgent need to boost the fighting forces in Kuwait. It was exacerbated by the primitive 
unloading facilities at the newly completed airfield that was made available to the 
British. Such considerations were unlikely to be unique to Vantage. 
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Perhaps even more worrying than the above was the fact that, despite the existence of 
airfield facilities in Kuwait and established bases at Bahrain and Aden, the RAF was 
unable to secure a satisfactory air defence environment prior to the arrival of the 
aircraft carrier HMS Victorious. Political restrictions on pre-emptive air strikes meant 
that the Iraqi airfields could not be attacked prior to an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, thus 
ceding the initiative in any air battle to the Iraqi air force. This placed a premium on 
an efficient air defence system. With only two squadrons of Hunter fighter/ground 
attack aircraft in range and reliant on HM Ships for radar cover, the RAF was not able 
to provide this. It is difficult to dispute Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee’s conclusion 
that, prior to the arrival of HMS Victorious, air defence ‘could have posed almost 
insuperable problems for the two Hunter Squadrons’.71 This conclusion is 
particularly damning given that Vantage was a pre-planned operation, with 
considerable host nation support conducted in reasonable proximity to existing RAF 
airfields at Bahrain and Sharjah. Such benign circumstances could not be relied upon 
in every situation. 
 
Maritime forces were less susceptible to political restrictions and were by their very 
nature deployable and sustainable without undue reliance on land facilities. Able to 
exploit the politically neutral medium of the sea, key ships were deployed 
unobtrusively off Kuwait prior to the request for intervention. Critical amongst these 
were HMS Bulwark and the LST HMS Striker from the Seaborne Tank Force. 
Without these vessels the early stages of Vantage would have been a shambles. They 
provided the only significant military force in Kuwait on 1 July. Unlike the troops 
arriving by air, Bulwark’s marines arrived fully equipped, with their own transport 
and ready to fight. Intelligent pre-positioning facilitated the timely arrival of Striker, 
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Bulwark and their embarked forces.72 Other maritime assets took longer to arrive. 
There was only one frigate off Kuwait until the arrival of HMS Loch Fyne on 5 July. 
This reduced the fire support that could be provided to the forces ashore and 
complicated sea control operations.  The aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, critical to 
the establishment of a favourable air situation around Kuwait, did not arrive until 9 
July. There had been no mine counter-measures capability in the Gulf before July. 
Consequently, the ships of the 108th Minesweeping Squadron were deployed from 
Malta. They did not arrive until 21 July, three weeks after the Kuwaiti request for 
assistance. In the context of Vantage, this was far too slow. The British Commander-
in-Chief, Middle East, Air Marshal Sir Charles Elworthy, was correct in his 
assessment that in the event of an attack the operation would probably have been over 
before all of the Royal Navy ships arrived in theatre.73
 
Competing Visions: Seaborne or Airborne? 
In the early 1960s the Admiralty’s concept for the future Royal Navy was driven by a 
need to cater for expeditionary operations east of Suez along the lines identified by 
the seaborne/airborne concept. Expeditionary warfare became the main role for the 
fleet.74 A combination of amphibious groups and aircraft carriers, supported by the 
full range of naval capabilities, would be used to deploy power overseas. The 
Admiralty emphasised the joint credentials of their views, developing a concept for a 
‘Joint Services Seaborne Force’ where maritime, air and land forces operated in 
partnership. In this way it would be possible to generate robust intervention 
capabilities well suited to British needs into the 1970s. The construction of new, large 
aircraft carriers was central to this approach. These, it was claimed, were not designed 
to remove the requirement for land based aircraft, but were to complement the 
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capabilities that could be provided by long-range air power. It should be noted that 
while this approach was joint in nature, it did imply a substantial investment in 
specifically maritime capabilities.75
 
The RAF adopted a rather different approach. There appears to have been an almost 
reflex opposition to the navy’s plan for large aircraft carriers. The Air Ministry was 
willing to accept the construction of very small carriers with limited capabilities but 
was viscerally opposed to the large, powerful strike carriers that the Admiralty 
insisted upon. The latter did not claim that new aircraft carriers would remove the 
need for land-based aircraft. However, such ships could pose a threat to the RAF’s 
own plans to update their own long-range strike force by consuming a significant 
proportion of the defence budget. The Air Ministry was willing to tolerate ships that 
were optimised for local air defence and close air support. They would not accept the 
requirement for more capable vessels able to conduct strike operations at extended 
range. This role, they believed, could and should be conducted by land-based aircraft 
alone. As such, the RAF developed an alternative to the Joint Services Seaborne 
Force. This was based on the use of long range aircraft from a series of notional island 
bases. Such bases were to be constructed on British administered territories. Use of 
these bases, it was claimed, would allow intervention by an infantry brigade group at 
ranges of up to 1,000 miles. In circumstances where reception facilities were not 
available a parachute battalion could conduct an assault landing to secure entry points. 
There was no place for aircraft carriers or major amphibious forces within this 
concept, although there would be a requirement for seaborne lift for follow-on 
support. The RAF plan was significantly less joint that it’s naval alternative.76
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The RAF island base strategy did not provide for a very convincing intervention 
capability. The Royal Navy argued that it lacked strategic reality, political feasibility 
and military practicality and that the use of such a strategy could support the Joint 
Services Seaborne Force, it could not replace it.77 It is difficult to disagree with this 
assessment. The inability of the island base strategy to provide the kind of balanced, 
expeditionary capabilities then envisaged ensured its failure. Without the assets 
envisaged in the Admiralty’s scheme it would not be possible to land balanced forces 
without conventional port facilities, not would it be possible to secure a satisfactory 
air defence environment beyond the vicinity of established bases. Such bases could 
not move to meet unforeseen contingencies. It is noteworthy that the navy’s plan 
sought to reduce reliance on overseas bases. The RAF scheme sought to compensate 
for the loss of bases through the construction of new facilities. The government was 
not convinced. On 30 July 1963 the Cabinet approved the construction of a new 
aircraft carrier of about 50,000 tons. The navy planned to call this ship HMS Queen 
Elizabeth and were confident enough to decide on a name for a sister ship.78
 
The Air Ministry lost the case on merit. The joint approach advocated by the 
Admiralty could meet the need for the type of operation envisaged by the 
seaborne/airborne concept. The island base strategy could not. Famously, however, 
the new aircraft carrier did not progress beyond the drawing board. In 1966 it was 
decided to cancel this ship, and to phase out the existing fleet of aircraft carriers in the 
1970s. In future land-based aircraft would fulfil all of the strike, air-defence and 
reconnaissance roles east of Suez. In support of this the RAF was to receive 50 F-111 
aircraft.79 This has sometimes been portrayed as a victory of the RAF’s vision over 
that of the navy. The reality is slightly different. It may be true that a rather unholy 
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alliance between the RAF and the Treasury helped to convince the Minister of 
Defence that aircraft carriers did not represent value for money.80 However, the 
decision to cancel plans for HMS Queen Elizabeth were not so much based on the 
belief that land-based aircraft could cater for all of the roles that this ship had been 
intended to fulfil. Rather, the belief was that land-based aircraft could fulfil such roles 
as were likely to remain in the 1970s.  
 
The key decision of 1966 was not the cancellation of the aircraft carrier, it was the 
acceptance by the British government that, beyond a brief transitional period, Britain 
would no longer aspire to maintain the kind of robust, independent expeditionary 
capability that had been previously been envisaged. With commitments reduced, there 
would not be any requirement to conduct landings against sophisticated opposition 
beyond the range of land based aircraft and without the aid of allies. Britain would no 
longer seek to provide another country with military assistance unless that country 
provided the facilities to make such assistance effective in time.81  The full range of 
capabilities anticipated by the seaborne/airborne concept was no longer necessary. For 
a time it was hoped that a combination of air and sea transport supported by long-
range, land based strike and reconnaissance aircraft would allow Britain to retain a 
useful, if limited, military capability east of Suez. Unfortunately continuing economic 
difficulties brought further cuts until in 1968 it was decided to withdraw almost all 
British forces from east of Suez and to re-focus on NATO tasks.82 Like the new 
carrier, the RAF’s F-111s were cancelled. Once again expeditionary warfare became a 
peripheral activity for the British armed forces. This was to remain the case until the 
end of the Cold War presented the armed forces with new challenges and new 
opportunities. 
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 Unity is Strength?83
In retrospect the seaborne/airborne concept appears to have been well suited to British 
defence needs, as they were perceived in the early 1960s. The concept articulated an 
approach to expeditionary operations that emphasised the need to exploit the different 
capabilities of air and sea transported forces in order to develop a robust intervention 
capability able to cater for a wide range of circumstances. The concept was based on a 
recognition that political imperatives would impinge on military plans. Seaborne and 
airborne forces would need to be available at short notice and be able to operate 
without undue reliance on local base facilities or on host nation support. Given the 
potential of enemy forces, subversive activity or political circumstances to deny 
access, they would also need the ability to fight their way in, albeit not against the 
strongest opposition without the aid of allies. Operation Vantage illustrated the 
necessity for the kind of capabilities identified by the concept. Later plans and 
operations, such as intervention in Tanganyika in 1964 or the various plans to 
intervene in Zanzibar, also in 1964, further demonstrated the value of mobile and 
flexible forces able to respond effectively to unforeseen challenges.84 It was the mid-
to-late 1960s before the amphibious and air transport capabilities that were required to 
support the seaborne/airborne reached maturity and the concept was been 
incorporated into a new Manual of Joint Warfare. Unfortunately by this time the 
policy that the concept had been designed to support had begun to change. This did 
not invalidate the logic of the seaborne/airborne concept, but it did make it appear less 
relevant to British defence needs. 
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Expeditionary operations were to remain out of vogue in British defence policy until 
the end of the Cold War prompted another change in strategic priorities. Once again 
the armed forces in general, and the navy in particular, sought to define a ‘new’ role 
for themselves providing flexible military options beyond Europe. At the strategic and 
operational levels there are obvious similarities between the principles that lay behind 
the seaborne concept and those articulated by the Royal Navy today. Both approaches 
focus on the need to maintain flexible forces to deal with unpredictable challenges. 
Both also stress the requirement for a joint approach to achieve a synergy between 
land, sea and air forces, and place an emphasis on maintaining specialist capabilities 
at high readiness. Both approaches also require significant investment in new 
equipment. Both the seaborne/airborne concept and Littoral Manoeuvre focus on the 
need to provide intervention in small and medium scale operations with an acceptance 
that large scale operations against sophisticated opposition will only be countenanced 
with the assistance of allies. 
 
The basic arguments deployed in support of the modern Royal Navy’s plans for 
Maritime Force Projection are remarkably similar to those employed by a different 
generation of planners in the 1960s. The terminology has changed, but the ability of 
the navy to provide ‘maritime strike’ and ‘littoral manoeuvre’ through the medium of 
a balanced and therefore versatile maritime force including powerful new aircraft 
carriers and amphibious task groups lay at the heart of the Joint Services Seaborne 
Force concept. The basic attributes that enabled this approach also enable the navy’s 
current plans.85 Littoral Manoeuvre’s emphasis on creating a forward deployed, 
combat ready, self-sustaining capability able to operate without recourse to host 
nation support and focused on an assault echelon of up to a brigade is extremely 
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reminiscent of the older concept. At a tactical level the similarities appear less 
evident. Littoral Manoeuvre is founded upon an ability to exploit the potential of 
cutting-edge technology that was simply not available in the 1960s. In their modern 
senses network enabled capabilities, sea basing, over the horizon operations and ship 
to objective manoeuvre were not options forty years ago. It remains to be seen if they 
will become truly effective in the future. Nevertheless, modern tactical and 
technological developments serve mainly to enhance the basic manoeuvre and strike 
potential that maritime forces have always enjoyed and that the seaborne/airborne 
concept supported. In this sense the latest developments in the field of expeditionary 
warfare fit comfortably within a framework established almost half a century ago. 
 
Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the seaborne/airborne concept was the 
emphasis that it placed on joint operations. This was reflected in the concept itself and 
in the institutional structures that resulted from it. Unfortunately it was not possible to 
eradicate the impact of single service priorities from the defence policy process. The 
seaborne/airborne concept and the focus on joint expeditionary warfare fostered much 
co-operation between the services. It also fostered intense rivalry, particularly 
between the navy and the RAF. Lord Carrington, First Lord of the Admiralty in the 
early 1960s, noted how bitter this quarrel became and suggested that ‘…a number of 
air marshals could hardly go to sleep at night without making sure that there wasn’t 
an admiral under the bed, and vice versa’.86 It would be naïve to assume that single-
service priorities do not still influence defence policy. However, since the 1990s there 
has been an overt emphasis on promoting ‘jointery’ within the armed forces. This has 
been reflected in the creation of joint doctrine, joint organisations and joint 
institutions. One must hope that this time around the services will be able to overcome 
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their various rivalries and jealousies to make the twenty-first century descendants of 
the seaborne/airborne concept truly effective. 
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